A new model of clientelism: political parties, public resources, and private contributors by Gherghina, Sergiu & Volintiru, Clara
  
Sergiu Gherghina and Clara Volintiru 
A new model of clientelism: political 
parties, public resources, and private 
contributors 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Gherghina, Sergiu and Volintiru, Clara (2017) A new model of clientelism: political parties, public 
resources, and private contributors. European Political Science Review, 9 (1). pp. 115-137. ISSN 
1755-7739 
 
DOI: 10.1017/S1755773915000326  
 
© 2015 European Consortium for Political Research 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73735/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2648915 
 
 
 
 
1 
A NEW MODEL OF CLIENTELISM: 
Political Parties, Public Resources, and Private Contributors 
 
Sergiu Gherghina 
Department of Political Science 
Goethe University Frankfurt 
sergiulor@yahoo.com 
   
Clara Volintiru 
Department of Government 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
clara.volintiru@gmail.com
Abstract 
The study of clientelism has pointed in the direction of a pyramid structure in which 
selective benefits are distributed with the help of brokers to individuals or groups in 
exchange for political support. This approach treats the resources aimed to enhance 
electoral mobilization as endogenous and fails to explain what happens when brokers have 
very low capacity. To address these problems this article proposes a bi-dimensional model of 
clientelism that emphasizes the role of exogenous resources. Accordingly, the vertical 
linkage between political parties and electorate is complemented by a horizontal nexus 
between parties and private contributors. In an environment characterized by low internal 
resources, parties involve external actors to get the necessary money. To illustrate how this 
mechanism works we focus on Romania between 2008 and 2012, a crucial case for the study 
of clientelism.  
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Introduction 
Political clientelism has been traditionally defined as the distribution of selective benefits to 
individuals or groups in exchange for political support (Katz 1986; Piattoni 2001; Hopkin 
2001; 2006b; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Earlier studies have shown that many 
contemporary clientelistic linkages take the form of a pyramid structure. This assumes the 
existence of exchanges between patrons (parties) and clients (voters) with the help of 
brokers (party organizations). In this scheme, the exchange takes the form of resource 
allocation or access (from parties to voters) and of electoral support (from voters to parties). 
Although useful, this structure raises two troubling questions. The first is a theoretical 
concern and refers to its one-dimensional character. While aimed to enhance electoral 
mobilization, clientelism relies on resources that have been treated until now as endogenous 
to the political system. Second, it is unclear what happens in those settings where brokers 
have low capacity because party membership organizations are minimal.  
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 This article tries to provide an answer to both questions by proposing a bi-
dimensional model of clientelism that emphasizes the role of exogenous resources. The 
vertical linkage between political parties and electorate is complemented by a horizontal 
nexus between parties and private contributors (economic agents). In an environment 
characterized by low internal resources, parties involve external actors to get the necessary 
money. The central argument of this new model is that public resources are no longer used 
in relationship with the electorate, but with private campaign donors. The latter benefit 
from public procurement procedures and supply financial support to political parties. To 
illustrate how this mechanism works we focus on Romania between 2008 and 2012, a crucial 
case for the study of clientelism due to the high number of references to this process in the 
media and international reports. Our empirical study uses qualitative content analysis of 
official public records, media reports and legislation regarding private donations and public 
procurement. Party histories and secondary data are also used to assess the extent of 
membership organizations.  
The major contribution brought by our paper to the existing literature lies in the 
identification of a new analytical layer. By exploring the link between political parties and 
economic actors, the bi-dimensional clientelistic model explains how a new category of 
clients emerges and how this linkage reinforces the mechanism of classic clientelism through 
redistribution of resources. Thus, unlike earlier studies that accounted for systemic 
explanation for the perpetuation of clientelism, our analysis brings in the picture the 
resources outside the political system. Still, the mechanism presented in this article is not 
the mere reflection of private campaign financing, corrupt practices, and traditional 
approaches of intertwinement between politicians and private donors. Instead, it 
emphasized a paradigm shift in how clientelistic parties focus on resource accumulation for 
political consolidation. 
The following section reviews the literature on clientelism and criticizes the 
shortcomings of the pyramid structure. Next, we briefly discuss the issue of private funding 
and emphasize the elements favoring a close connection between private contributors and 
political parties. The third section presents in detail the new model of clientelism and 
explains its theoretical mechanisms. The fourth section brings empirical evidence from the 
Romanian case to illustrate how this new model functions in real-life. The conclusions 
summarize the main findings and discuss the implications of our analysis.  
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The Clientelistic Phenomenon: Structural Changes and Adaptation 
The studies concerned with the clientelistic phenomenon can be seen as having a similar 
evolution with the changes and adaptations of the clientelistic manifestations themselves. 
Most of the relevant literature is structured around the model of exchanges between a 
patron and a client, but there are significant variations in how this relationship is further 
framed and contextualized across different countries and political settings. As such, most of 
the first comprehensive studies on this topic looked at clientelistic exchanges either as a 
phenomenon embedded in the political practice (Weingrod 1968; Scott 1972), or as a 
broader cultural and societal issue (Gellner and Waterbury 1977, Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1984). 
 Given the opportunity of regime changes in many of the most frequently covered 
cases of clientelism spread across Latin America and Southern Europe, the literature 
gradually focused on the connection between political transformations and the adaptive 
reactions of agents involved in clientelistic practices (Lyrintzis 1984; Hopkin and Mastrapole 
2001; Caciagli 2006). Consequently, political scientists was able to provide much more 
structured perspectives on this phenomenon, linking the participants within coherent 
schemes of electoral mobilization (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Hopkin 2006a). 
 From very early on the literature has revealed the concept of machine politics and 
the corrupt connections with business groups and private interests (Graziano 1978; Chubb 
1981; 1983; Stokes 2005). While in practice, we often see pervasive corruption as 
intrinsically connected to clientelistic networks, the two should be treated separately from a 
theoretical point of view. This disentanglement of clientelistic transactions and corruption is 
useful in distinguishing the structural changes suffered by the clientelistic system itself. In 
this sense, given its network deployment, political relevance and consequence, and 
interpersonal normative function, clientelism presents a wealth of avenues to explore and 
assess. In this sense, our assessment of the political parties’ reliance on public contractors is 
directly addressing the aforementioned lineage, in the existent literature, which targets the 
clientelistic phenomenon.  
 
The Pyramid Structure and its Shortcomings 
Given this phenomenon’s survival and entrenchment within the context of democratic 
politics, clientelism can be analyzed as a multi-layered system, with complex structures. 
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Gradually, the dyadic ties evolved into a more ‘complex pyramid exchange network of client-
broker-patron exchange’ (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, p.8). Clientelism becomes the object 
of market exchanges between supply provided by the political parties and candidates, on 
one side, and the demand of clients willing to exchange their votes for goods and favors, on 
the other side. Within this approach, the clients’ leverage is high as they are no longer 
forced into a relationship of asymmetrical power but voluntary participants into a 
transaction (Hopkin 2006a). In other words, ‘democracy strengthens the clients’ bargaining 
leverage vis-à-vis brokers and patrons’ (Piattoni 2001). 
Following these developments, clientelism can be visualized in the form of a pyramid 
structure with clients at the base, brokers in the middle and suppliers at the top. Referring to 
politics, this pyramid approach includes three categories of participants: 1) the electorate 
(clients) as a general group, and the party supporters or voters, as specific groups of 
beneficiaries, 2) party organizations (brokers) including members or local leaders acting as 
intermediaries between the electorate and the supply side and 3) political leaders or party in 
the central office (patrons) able to control and distribute goods and services to the clients 
(Figure 1). The ‘broker-mediated distribution’ (Stokes et al. 2013) is probably the most 
important addition to the clientelistic phenomenon in the transition from personal 
patronage to the new large scale, electorally driven system.  
 
Figure 1: The Pyramid Clientelistic Structure 
 
               Political Patrons  
        (Parties) 
 
 
 
       Brokers  
                                               (Party Org.) 
 
         Pork      Vote                  Personal         Electoral Support  
        barrel   Buying  Favors          (Votes) 
        Clients  
   (Electorate) 
 
 
Second, there are the vote-buying strategies in which money and goods are offered – during 
the electoral campaign or Election Day - usually on a non-iterative basis. Brokers are 
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necessary intermediaries, but their influence is considerably diminished compared to the 
previous case of personal favors, because they are no longer required to provide the 
functions of selection and oversight. Furthermore, the clients can be both the loyal 
supporters and the undecided voters. Stokes et al. (2013) bring evidence to show that loyal 
supporters that are usually the target of non-iterative exchanges from parties. Gherghina 
(2013) illustrates that, in addition to targeting their own supporters, parties use vote-buying 
strategies to persuade the undecided. As a result, it is not so much about persuading votes, 
as much as mobilizing turnout.  
Third, there is a formal exchange of targeted public spending in return for political 
support. This process of channeling public resources or material benefits to selected districts 
or particular categories of voters is generally referred to as pork-barrel spending (Ferejohn 
1974; Shepsle & Weingast 1994; Case 2001; Calvo and Murrilo 2004; Ashworth & de 
Mesquita 2006; Stokes et al 2013). While serving to strengthen the electoral support for the 
ruling party, pork-barrel politics follows to a certain extent the logic of programmatic 
mechanisms, and as such it is a formal process of rewarding loyal supporters, that bypasses 
the party organizations. Examples include targeting spending on wages or pensions for 
certain categories of people, or localized programs of infrastructure development.  
In spite of its useful structuring of linkages, this pyramid conceptualization of 
clientelism has several flaws. To begin with, it assumes that all selectively distributed goods 
and services are public resources controlled by the political patron and deployed according 
to an electoral strategy of survival. This assumption is problematic for two reasons: 1) 
certain favors such as public contracts usually require more than just political support in 
exchange, and 2) to control substantial resources, patrons need electoral victories; this leads 
to a vicious circle in which only ruling parties can employ clientelistic practices. While the 
first assumption will be addressed by the present research, the latter has already been 
contradicted by evidence from earlier studies, showing that it is not only the ruling parties 
that deploy clientelistic tactics (Piattoni 2001; Schaffer 2007; Gherghina 2013).   
Furthermore, the pyramid structure assumes the existence of an effective territorial 
deployment of party organizational capacity. Accordingly, it takes for granted the existence 
of brokers (i.e. intermediary level) in the clientelistic pyramid. Since party membership is 
shrinking in many West European countries (Mair & van Biezen 2001; van Biezen et al. 2012) 
and has been minimal in Eastern Europe (Webb & White 2007; Lewis 2008), one can easily 
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argue that political parties face significant challenges in terms of their brokering capacity. 
Consequently, their capacity to engage in several clientelistic linkages is fairly limited. 
In light of these shortcomings, we argue that clientelism can be better understood – 
at least in Eastern Europe – as a composite of horizontal and vertical linkages. In doing so, 
we bring in the picture the role of private donors whose resources can be traced to public 
procurement contracts. While the issue of private party financing has been extensively 
discussed in the literature, to our knowledge there is no prior linkage with the clientelistic 
system of resource distribution.  
Private funding becomes important when vote buying prevails over the other two 
forms of clientelistic exchanges, i.e. personal favors and pork-barrel. This happens because 
the latter rely more on state resources, while vote buying can make efficient use of private 
contributions. While we do not expect vote-buying to be the most determinant clientelistic 
electoral strategy employed by a political party, as it is usually complemented by other tools, 
we explore in detail this exchange system in which liquidity plays the major role.  
In our model state resources are not used to reach the clients (as in the pyramid 
structure) but are directed towards private contractors in exchange for money. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the private donations is a proxy assessment of the informal 
exchange mechanisms that occur within this horizontal linkage system. Vote-buying is more 
frequently financed through non-declared income, but we suspect it is derived through the 
same mechanisms. The following section explains in detail how private funding creates the 
nexus with political parties in our modified model of political clientelism. 
 
The Nexus with Private Funding 
Almost one century ago political parties were considered the pillars of representative 
democracies (Bryce 1921; Schattschneider 1942). Since then, their importance remained 
unchanged but their functions diversified. Parties are the transmission belt between society 
and the state being the channel through which individuals and groups in society are 
integrated into the political system. Parties articulate, aggregate and represent interests, 
mobilizing the general public during elections (van Biezen & Kopecky 2007; Katz 2011). Since 
politics consists of complex and sophisticated processes the choice among initial alternatives 
is not often accessible to ordinary voters. Parties simplify choices and generate symbols of 
identification and loyalty (Neumann 1956; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000). Following elections, 
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parties are essential for government through political decisions and implementation, i.e. 
policy-making. To fulfill these functions and exercise their core activities parties need 
substantial resources.  
Costs related to administration and election campaigns are high – and have increased 
over time – and parties use a mix of private and public sources of income. Since internal 
party funding (e.g. membership fees, profits of party-owned businesses) is fairly limited, 
political parties have to rely on external means of financing such as contributions or 
donations from private individuals and companies.1 In this context, the major risk lies in the 
misuse of these resources to influence specific political decisions. Earlier studies identified 
the existence of a causal relationship between campaign contributions and policy outcomes 
but found it difficult to pinpoint the divers behind the effect, e.g. politicians’ ideology, 
particular favors, or specific types of contributors (Chappell 1982; Snyder 1990; Stratmann 
1995; Ansolabehere et al. 2004). To partly diminish these risks and to ensure multi-party 
competition, many countries in Europe have adopted regulations on public funding. These 
provisions bring some disadvantages since public money may lead to dependence on the 
state and inhibit parties’ connections with the electorate (van Biezen 2004). Under these 
circumstances, private finances can be healthy for a political system if it is strictly regulated 
to allow for transparency (of revenues and expenditures) and if there is a balance between 
the two types of funding.  
The debate on private funding has been built around three inter-connected topics: 
illicit contributions, inequalities, and corruption. First, the illicit contributions refer to the 
private donations that contravene existing laws of political financing. Illegal donations cast 
major doubts on the morality of the political competitors accepting them and often translate 
into non-transparent handling (La Raja 2008). There are rare instances in which political 
parties keep reliable records of private contributions and often avoid or falsify public 
disclosure. Consequently, illicit donations are considered scandalous independent of their 
effect. This is the case even when the contributor does not expect any benefit in return for 
the donation (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002) especially if the donors are contested sources such as 
mafias or drug cartels (Freidenberg & Levitsky 2006). Second, private resources often lead to 
                                                        
1 We see parties as voluntary private associations that perform public roles and thus our argument considers 
internal party funding as a component of private financing. There are some authors who have differentiated 
between the two, one of the first being von Beyme (1985) who suggested a typology with three forms of party 
financing: internal, external, and public.  
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unequal competition for public office. Political parties or candidates with wealthy supporters 
are in a better position than their competitors. They can spend more in electoral campaigns, 
increase their visibility, reach more voters and thus gain greater political influence (Ewing 
1992; Johnston & Pattie 1995; Fisher 2002).  
Third, and by far the most discussed problem associated with private funding, there 
is a risk of corruption. Although a contested concept, corruption essentially rests on the 
distinction between formal obligations to pursue the public good and behaviors or practices 
that undermine the public good. Corruption takes several forms when private funding is 
involved and they can refer either to sources or to mechanisms through which political 
decisions are influenced and distorted. To begin with the sources, one of the most obvious 
situations is the use of money originating from corrupt transactions. In this case the 
donation may not be illicit, but remains highly problematic because the receiving party 
overlooks misconduct of the donor. Related to the latter, corruption scandals surround the 
acceptance of money from disreputable sources (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Apart from the 
overlap with their illicit character (see above), tainted donors are usually associated with 
tainted practices by the electorate and media.  
Moving on to the mechanisms, private money often comes with strings attached. 
Contributors and parties are likely to enter a relationship of reciprocity in which money are 
offered in exchange for specific political decisions. In extreme situations, when the 
sponsorship is high, the party is effectively bought and abandons its initial purposes. As a 
result, it delivers policies to the donors and partly or completely fails delivering them to 
society (Nassmacher 1993; Williams 2000). Simply put, political parties make use of state 
resources to favor or to promise favors to their benefactors. The corrupt practices include 
also the spending for unfair or illegal purposes such as vote-buying. Parties and provide 
voters gifts of various kinds (see the empirical section of this article) aiming at securing their 
electoral support. Empirical evidence shows that in recent years vote buying remains a 
component of many election campaigns around the world. While in theory the usual 
suspects are the impoverished countries where ‘the politics of the belly’ prevails, vote 
buying occurs in countries with various degrees of economic development and democracy 
(Pinto-Duschinsky 2002; Brusco et al. 2004; Schaffer 2007; Bratton 2008).  
The policy distortion and illegal spending fueled by private financing lie at the core of 
the horizontal linkage in our model (Figure 2). In this respect, political parties make massive 
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use of private contributions to buy electoral support. In doing so, they do not allocate state 
resources to directly buy votes but channel them towards the private contractors as rewards 
them for their generous contributions. The horizontal clientelistic loop created between 
parties and private donors is reinforced by their mutual benefits: the former retain power, 
while the latter increase their economic profits.   
 
A New Model of Clientelism 
As preciously explained, the new model of clientelism works best when the resource 
allocation is narrowed to one major strategy, i.e. vote buying. These are the circumstances 
under which the involvement of private contributors brings large benefits to parties, i.e. 
more money to buy electoral support. These two changes lead to a bi-dimensional 
clientelistic structure (Figure 2) with two types of exchanges: vertical (between parties and 
voters) and horizontal (between parties and private contractors).  
One characteristic of this model is the minor role played by brokers leading to fewer 
clientelist means used to reach the electorate. This is consistent with empirical realities of 
the most recent decades in which party membership has decreased considerably. Small 
party organizations mean few available brokers and thus large-scale distribution of personal 
favors is unlikely to happen. At the same time, in the context of a decreasing turnout (Cassel 
& Luskin 1988; Flickinger & Studlar 1992; Gray & Caul 2000) the strategy of continuously 
fueling the loyal voters through personal favors becomes less effective that the one-off 
exchanges in the electoral periods such as vote-buying. In brief, both dimensions of 
decreasing participation – involvement in parties and voting - determine a shift in the 
clientelistic paradigm. The discretionary distribution of benefits is partly deprived of party 
brokers and permanent clients. As such, it becomes significantly more focused on 
accumulating resources, and deploying such funds within the specific electoral periods. 
Another characteristic is the limited role of pork-barrel. It is an effective mean of 
mobilizing the electorate both by distributing benefits and by showing loyalty to the 
electoral base. In addition, it is entirely legal if not necessarily legitimate, to support the 
interests of the party voters more intensely than those of the rest of the electorate. In spite 
of these advantages, it is less used in comparison to other clientelistic strategies for at least 
two reasons. First, it is costly and thus harder to use in an environment of budgetary 
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constraints. Second, it is limited to the relationship between the ruling party and core voters 
and thus not helpful in mobilizing undecided voters.  
 
Figure 2: The Bi-dimensional Clientelistic Structure 
 
        Public procurement  
             Political Patrons                             Private  
     (Parties)             Contractors 
           Private financing 
 
 
   Brokers  
              (Party Org.) 
 
Vote                    Electoral Support  
Buying     (Votes) 
Clients  
                      (Electorate) 
 
 
Following these changes, the strategy of vote-buying becomes the key element for resource 
distribution. Its efficiency does not rely on pyramid informal structures maintained over time 
but on the level of allocated resources. It bypasses the selection and oversight functions of 
the long-term clientelistic linkages. Reversely, it is particularly conditioned by the patrons’ 
availability of resources. This creates the need of the clientelistic system to extend its 
mechanisms of resources accumulation. This is the moment when private contractors 
become vectors of resource accumulation in the clientelistic scheme. In light of the potential 
profit they can make, private contractors working on public contracts are likely to be highly 
involved in the horizontal linkage depicted in Figure 2. They engage in a closed circuit with 
political patrons exchanging private funds for public resources. Private contractors receive 
public funds through public procurement contracts, which lead back to the political parties 
in government through legal private donations. While this exchange may involve secondary 
processes (e.g. illegal donations) it sheds light on the preferential resource allocations and 
indicates that the accumulation of resources is a priority for political parties. These 
contractors lack incentives to target electoral mobilization (clients) or to enhance party 
organizations (brokers) and that is why they are unlikely to engage in the horizontal 
clientelism. With one exception, the situation in which private contractors electorally 
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mobilize their employees, there is a clear distinction between the horizontal and vertical 
clientelism: one is mobilizing resources, and the other is mobilizing voters.  
Through the development of a horizontal layer, the clientelistic system is not only a 
principal vehicle of electoral mobilization, but also one of resource accumulation. It no 
longer serves as a continuous platform of patronage, but works as a ‘buy-off’ system limited 
in time and value. This new survival strategy provides two advantages to the political parties. 
First, the clientelistic networks are more easily manageable as they comprise fewer 
participants, clearly separated. On the horizontal linkage the interactions usually involve 
political patrons and private contractors. On the vertical linkage, the structure includes 
patrons, brokers and clients, but it is much narrower than in the pyramid structure. Second, 
this clientelistic arrangement allows more resources to be accumulated by the patrons. 
Accordingly, it ensures the convergence of party elites’ interests and thus improves the 
possibilities of remaining in power. On the background of a general party cartelization 
tendency, political parties can become even further intertwined as they benefit from the 
same distributional paths.  
In contrast, the electorate loses. While the pyramid clientelistic model brings some 
benefits to the clients through the preferential distribution of public resources, the bi-
dimensional clientelistic system deprives voters from their share of public resources; it goes 
instead to private contractors. In this new setting, the clientelistic linkages have also an 
exploitative function in addition to that of electoral mobilization. The importance electoral 
competition is matched by resource accumulation and they reinforce each other.  
So far, we have built a theoretical model of clientelism meant to better capture the 
types of exchanges in which political parties may engage in contemporary times. To show 
how it works we use the case study of Romania between 2008 and 2012 (the most recent 
legislative elections). This is the most likely case where the new model of clientelism can be 
observed. As illustrated in the following section, the Romanian politics has features of 
cartelization, the parties have small organizations, and there is extensive evidence of vote-
buying. All these features contribute to the emergence of a solid horizontal linkage between 
parties and private contractors.  
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The Functioning of the Bi-dimensional Clientelism 
This section starts with a brief presentation of the Romanian parties’ features in terms of 
cartelization of politics and limited membership organization. The second sub-section brings 
evidence about the vertical clientelism, while the third presents in detail the horizontal 
linkage.  
 
Cartelization of Politics and Membership Organizations 
Until the legislative elections of December 2012 Romania was the only East European 
country where no new political parties have entered the parliamentary arena for two 
decades.2 Since 1992 only a handful of political competitors have secured parliamentary 
seats and thus participated in coalition governments. Among these parties, some failed to 
gain parliamentary seats and have never managed to return to the legislature since then, 
e.g. the Christian Democratic National Peasants Party in 2000, the Greater Romania Party 
(PRM) in 2008. There were many failures of other political competitors to gain parliamentary 
representation, e.g. the Alliance for Romania and the Union of Right Forces in 2000, the 
Socialist Alliance Party in consecutive elections, the New Generation Party (PNG) in 2004 and 
2008 etc.  
The four parties with a continuous presence in Parliament that have shaped the 
Romanian political scene over the last two decades are the Social Democratic Party (PSD), 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).3 These parties display inclusive coalition formation patterns 
in the sense that each party joined a coalition with every other party. In addition, the elite is 
very homogenous and rarely changes: a large amount of the members of Parliament (MPs) is 
re-nominated and re-elected in consecutive terms (Stefan et al. 2012). Even when new 
parties emerge, like the case of the People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD), a part of the elite 
promoted to Parliament belonged in the past to some of the major political parties 
(Gherghina & Soare 2013).  
In addition to this cartelization of politics, (Katz & Mair 1995) the alternation in 
government makes every party subject of clientelism (both vertical and horizontal). A brief 
                                                        
2 2The partial exception to this rule is the Conservative Party (formerly Romanian Humanist Party) that gained 
parliamentary seats always in alliance with the social democrats. 
3 For reasons of simplicity, this paper uses the current names of the parties (as of July 2014). 
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history of parties’ electoral performances will provide a better understanding of their 
dynamic over the last two decades, in general, and of the situation in the two most recent 
elections in particular. The PSD is a successor communist party, being the largest in the 
Romanian party system. Its origins go back to the 1992 split of the National Salvation Front 
(FSN), the winner of the 1990 elections. Following an internal dispute between the first two 
men from the party elite, the party split in two: the FDSN (later PDSR and PSD) and FSN 
(later PD and PDL). Since its formation, the PSD won five out of six legislative elections and 
took part in four coalition governments (three times as the formateur). Since 2000 the party 
enjoys a stable electoral support situated around 33% of the votes. The other successor 
party, the PDL, is the second largest party in Romania throughout the post-communist 
period. It got second in the 1996, 2004 (in two different electoral alliances), 2008, and 2012 
legislative elections. It was part of three coalition governments, in one of them (2008-2012) 
as the main governing party. Unlike the PSD, the PDL is not characterized by constantly high 
electoral results across the entire post-communist period. Its electoral support is quite 
oscillating with high levels of volatility.   
The PNL is the third largest party in post-communist Romania. In the most recent 
legislative elections (2012) it ran into an alliance with the PSD (the Social Liberal Union – 
USL), registering a landslide win. It has participated in two other coalition governments 
(1996 and 2004, once as the leading party). Its average share of votes is around 15% with a 
tendency to stabilize in the most recent decade. The UDMR has a very stable electorate and 
has enjoyed a pivotal role several times. It has participated four times in government 
coalitions being partner with each of the previous three parties. Apart from these four 
political parties, this analysis will also refer to the PPDD because it has engaged in clientelism 
to secure a position in the parliamentary arena. It came third in the 2012 elections 
(approximately 14% of the votes) but soon after the vast majority of its parliamentary elite 
left the party.  
Let us now turn to membership organizations to see the extent to which patrons can 
rely on brokers for vertical clientelism. An extensive body of literature has illustrated that 
political parties in Eastern Europe have very small membership organizations (Mair & van 
Biezen 2001; Szczerbiak 2001; van Biezen 2003; Weldon 2006; Spirova 2007; Webb & White 
2007; Lewis 2008; van Biezen et al. 2012). In Romania, compared to other countries in the 
post-communist area, the percentage of members is quite high. This is partly due to election 
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laws that require parties to have a few thousands members (variations between 10,000 and 
25,000, depending on the law) to register in the electoral competition. Figure 3 depicts the 
evolution of membership percentages at country and party level in the 2008 and 2012 
legislative elections.4 With the exception of the PSD, the Romanian parties have membership 
organizations smaller than 1% in the electorate. Among these, the youngest party (PPDD) 
has less than 0.3%. In addition to these low levels, the PDL has lost members between the 
two elections. The same trend can be observed at country level. The PSD is the only party 
that has significantly augmented its membership organization from approximately 1.6% to 
more than 2.2%. 
 
Figure 3: Party Membership as Percentage in the Electorate in Romania 
 
Source: Official Party Registry in Romania (2012); Gherghina (2014) 
 
These numbers indicate that Romanian political parties do not have strong membership 
organizations that would allow them to engage in multiple clientelistic linkages with the 
electorate. Although there is some variation in the size of membership organizations, none 
of the presented political parties developed strong organizations that allow them to pursue 
a broad range of clientelistic practices. Instead, these limited membership organizations 
reduce the spectrum of clientelistic exchanges to vote-buying and focus on cooperation with 
external actors to secure the necessary resources. Both issues are explored in the following 
sub-sections.  
 
                                                        
4 The data for UDMR in 2012 is not available and the PPDD has been created in September 2011. The 
percentage for the PDL in 2012 is calculated on the basis of 28 out of 41 territorial organizations, the party did 
not supply the rest of data. 
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Vote-buying and Private Donations 
This section focuses on the most popular three forms of vote-buying: 1) outright vote-buying 
is the payment of money from candidates or parties to the voters in return for votes; 2) 
treating is the provision of food or alcohol in exchange for votes but can also refer to feasts 
put on for voters and 3) conveyance is the transport of voters to polling venues. 
Combinations between these three forms are likely to occur, e.g. conveyance is usually 
accompanied by outright vote-buying or treating. To show the incidence of vote-buying 
practices in Romania we use two sources: media reports and the official number of criminal 
case files registered at the High Court of Cassation and Justice (Romania’s Supreme Court of 
Justice).  
The media reports were used to collect data on vote-buying in electoral campaigns 
and during Election Day for 2008-2012. We used the online and printed versions of five 
national daily newspapers, considered the most important in terms of subscribers: Adevarul, 
Cotidianul, Evenimentul zilei, Gandul, and Jurnalul National. 5  In addition to these 
newspapers, reports from the Romanian Press Agency (Mediafax) were also taken into 
consideration. Many articles included vote-buying allegations without substantial 
documentation. We have considered only those cases in which vote-buying was either well 
documented by journalists (i.e. interviews with bribe receivers, photos or videos) or the 
situation ended up with a criminal case record. As a result, the final dataset includes a total 
number of 581 articles reporting on various types of vote-buying. The articles refer to 136 
cases of vote-buying with considerable overlap in terms of coverage. Table 1 summarizes the 
vote-buying practices reported in the media indicating the number of practices and the 
county (territorial administrative division corresponding to constituencies in the previous PR 
list system) where they took place. Sometimes, more vote-buying activities occurred in the 
same county and that is why the number of practices does not always coincide with the 
number of counties in brackets.  
Treating appears to be the most popular vote-buying practice among the Romanian 
parties during electoral campaigns or during election days. It takes various forms from 
concerts (where food is provided) and feasts thrown for the electorate to bags with gluttony 
or clothes, free one-day excursions, and services provided for free such as medical 
                                                        
5 Tabloids were not included in the analysis. Over time, only one of the selected newspapers was biased in 
reporting vote-buying practices: Jurnalul National favored PSD and reported considerably less on its deeds. 
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consultations or car washing. There are two reasons behind its extensive use. First, parties 
can argue that these are not vote-buying actions but charity events or treating matching the 
legal requirements. The legislation allowed until 2012 the distribution of symbolic goods 
with the party logo on them (e.g. t-shirts, lighters, pens) (Gherghina 2013). The new law, 
adopted several weeks before the 2012 elections, allows parties to distribute goods with a 
maximum value of 2.5 €. Second, treating is likely to reach more voters at a lower cost than 
outright vote-buying. For example, the costs of a feast thrown for a few hundred voters are 
significantly lower than money given to each individual voter. Based on media reports, when 
bought separately, a vote costs on average 12 €.  
The numbers in Table 1 indicate widespread vote-buying throughout the entire 
territory of the country – there are quite a few counties (out of a total of 41) listed in 
brackets. It is relevant to note that the three major parties (PSD, PDL, and PNL) established 
local organizations in every commune (several villages together), thus ensuring an 
exhaustive territorial coverage and extended possibilities of using such oractices. When 
comparing the three major parties, the PNL uses the least vote-buying but its activity 
intensifies as soon as it gets into electoral alliance with the PSD. The PNL appears to use 
more vote-buying when in government, e.g. in 2008 and 2012, compared with the situations 
when it is in opposition. For the other two parties, the propensity of vote-buying is not 
connected with their government or opposition status. They use this clientelistic linkage in 
almost every instance. For example, before the 2009 presidential elections the PDL was 
incumbent and the PSD in the opposition and the intensity of their vote-buying activities 
does not differ significantly. Similarly, the vote buying does not change when the party gets 
into opposition. For example, the PSD was in government before the 2004 legislative 
elections and in opposition before the 2008 general elections and 2009 presidential and EU 
elections. However, there is no decrease in terms of bribery. 
The number of criminal case files registered at the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice substantiate the empirical evidence from media reports. For all elections and 
referendums in 2008 and 2009, the Court has analyzed a total number of 7,956 Police 
documented cases of vote-buying. For the 2012 local elections there are 2,052 cases, while 
in the 2012 referendum there were 632 cases (Agerpress 2012).  
Table 1: Vote‐buying Practices in the Romanian Elections (2008‐2012) 
    Treating  Outright vote‐buying  Conveyance 
2008 Local 
 
PDL  1 (Bacau)     
PSD  2 (Bucharest)  1 (Arges)   
2008 
Legislative 
 
PDL  4 (Bistrita‐Nasaud, Neamt, Prahova, Vrancea)  1 (Constanta)   
PNL  4 (Calarasi, Ilfov, Ialomita)  3 (Bucharest, Constanta)  1 (Bucharest) 
PSD  8 (Arges, Bacau, Bucharest, Calarasi, Gorj, Ialomita)     
2009 EU 
 
 
PDL  1 (Bucharest) 
   
3 (Bucharest, Dambovita, 
Prahova) 
PNL      1 (Bucharest) 
PSD  5 (Bucharest, Dolj, Giurgiu,Ialomita, Iasi) 
 
 
5 (Bucharest, Ilfov, 
Vrancea, Galati) 
 
7 (Bistrita‐Nasaud, Bucharest, 
Giurgiu, Ilfov, Olt, 
Teleorman) 
2009 
Presidential 
 
PDL  6 (Bucharest, Gorj, Iasi, Prahova, Timis) 
 
2 (Giurgiu, Vrancea) 
 
3 (Bucharest, Dambovita, 
Suceava) 
PNL  1 (Bucharest)     
PSD  4 (Arges, Constanta, Maramures, Vrancea)  1 (Constanta)  3 (Bucharest, Ialomita, Ilfov) 
2012 Local 
  
PDL  12 (Arad, Bucharest, Constanta, Dambovita, Gorj, Prahova, Sibiu, 
Valcea) 
2 (Bacau, Cluj) 
   
PNL + 
PSD 
11 (Arad, Buzau, Olt, Constanta, Galati, Gorj, Hunedoara, Iasi, 
Prahova) 
3 (Constanta, Dolj, 
Vrancea)   
PPDD  2 (Arges, Caras‐Severin)     
2012 
Legislative 
 
PDL  7 (Timis, Vaslui, Neamt, Brasov, Olt, Iasi)  1 (Neamt) 
PNL + 
PSD 
12 (Cluj, Dolj, Iasi, Prahova, Neamt, Severin, Suceava, Valcea, 
Vaslui) 
1 (Dolj) 
 
2 (Cluj, Teleorman) 
 
PPDD  3 (Gorj, Iasi)     
2012 
Referendum 
PNL + 
PSD 
2 (Suceava, Timis) 
 
6 (Alba, Cluj, Bistrita‐
Nasaud, Bihor) 
8 (Bucharest, Dolj, Olt, 
Severin, Teleorman) 
Source: Adevarul, Cotidianul, Evenimentul zilei, Gandul, Jurnalul National, and Mediafax.
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The money used for vote-buying come from private sources and they take two forms: super-
fees and donations. A super-fee refers to supersized party membership fees paid by specific 
members. The average value of a regular fee / month is 2 € and all fees that exceed the 
value of 10 minimum wages should be declared (super-fees). Donations are money coming 
from private individuals and firms. Our analysis lumps them because quite often CEO’s make 
individual donations in addition to their firm’s contribution. This procedure masks the real 
donation made by a private firm. Table 2 summarizes the amounts received by each party 
between 2008 and 2012; the figures are those reported by parties. It can be easily observed 
that the amount of both super-fees and donations is considerably high in election years 
(2008, 2009 and 2012) compared to non-election years. In light of our argument, these hikes 
in funding during electoral years can be linked to the costs during campaign and elections. 
As the three major parties have had relatively good chances to end up in the government 
coalition (with the exception of 2012), the received amounts are substantial.  
 
Table 2: Private Donations Received by the Romanian Political Parties (million €) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
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PDL 5.35 8.35 3.30 7.00 0.05 1.10 0.02 1.30 0.21 6.70 
PNL 2.15 6.85 0.85 1.50 0.005 0.45 0.002 0.28 0.30 1.30 
PSD 4.50 5.90 2.50 2.90 0.07 1.85 0.13 0.16 1.20 4.50 
UDMR 
    
0.003 0.10 0.006 0.20 0.001 1.00 
PPDD 
         
1.10 
Note: In 2012, there is an additional 4.10 million € for the USL (PSD+PNL).  
Source: Official Gazette (2009-2013). 
 
The collected data have allowed us to check where the top donors are located. Their 
territorial dispersion brings evidence linking them to vote-buying. Each of the three major 
parties counts on extensive private contributions in those counties where many vote-buying 
activities take place (Table 1). The PDL has a large amount of donations in Bucharest (around 
30% of top donations) and Cluj (10%-20% of top donations). The PNL benefits from 
substantial contributions of private companies based in Bucharest (around 27% of top 
donations). The PSD has substantial donations from companies in Teleorman (40%-51% of 
top donations) and Constanta (17%-97% of top donations). 
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The Horizontal Linkage: Parties and Private Contractors 
Our argument is that some of the private money from Table 2 follows the horizontal linkage 
presented in Figure 2. This linkage means that political parties allocate public resources to 
private contractors through public procurement in exchange for formal or informal 
contributions. Let us take a close look at this exchange in Romania between 2008 and 2012.  
The size and problems of public procurement make it efficient in transforming public 
funds into private funds. The European Commission estimates the average value of public 
procurements in the EU Member States at 18% of the country’s GDP, while Romania 
allocates approximately 10% of its GDP (Eurostat, 26.03.2012). The procurement budget is 
not included in the annual national budget as a stand-alone category, but as part of each 
public authority’s budget making it extremely difficult to investigate it rigorously.  
There are two major categories of problems regarding public procurement 
procedures in Romania. First, there is the issue of proper control mechanisms. Although the 
Electronic System for Public Procurement (SEAP) is active since 2006, in 2011 only 16% of 
enterprises in Romania opted to access tender documents and specifications in the 
electronic procurement system, compared to the EU average of 21%6. It is common practice 
for the open advertisements on SEAP to be discussed or negotiated in person between a 
representative of the contracting authority and the winning economic operator. While 
official standards have been set to establish the framework for each contracting authority 
throughout the year, there are large difference between these principles and what happens 
in practice. Most of these refer to the allocated budget for different procedures, and to the 
disregard for the initial inventory of necessities (Ministry of Public Finance 2010; 2011; 
Romanian Court of Accounts 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011). Second, there are preferential criteria 
set in the tender book with the purpose of favoring certain contractors, in contradiction to 
legal provisions (Government Decree 34/2006). Another way to exert positive discrimination 
for certain economic operators is to change the selection criteria during the procedure, 
leaving ‘unwanted’ applicants with insufficient time to comply. 
To illustrate how the horizontal linkage functions we have matched the donations of 
private contractors with their benefits from private procurement. In this case, the benefits 
come from direct allocation of public contracts, or from open contest public procurement 
procedures. Table 3 includes 10 examples for each major party whose activity is mostly 
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based on the direct allocation of public contracts, i.e. the fastest and safest procedure of 
employing private contractors by public institutions. The final list of matches between public 
contracts and party financing is considerably longer. In addition, many donors have indirect 
benefits from public policy choices that do not necessarily involve the direct transactions, 
like in the case of public procurement contracts. A special interest in favorable regulation 
and policies is found in the case of companies from sectors such as energy distribution, 
agriculture, or cargo activities.  
The activity profiles of these companies indicate the extent to which their revenues 
are based on public procurement contracts. All three parties have many top donors with 
business activities in the fields of constructions, infrastructure, and energy distribution. It 
must be noted that the companies made efforts. Some top donors divide their contributions 
into several payments so that without a proper analysis of the data, the donations would 
appear modest or of marginal value.  
At the same time, among the top donors that benefit from public procurement 
contracts, some of the private firms contribute to the campaign of more parties (e.g. SC 
Victor Construct in Table 3). When comparing party donations to the main competing 
political parties, there is a pattern of multiple donations for 65 out of 1,430 donors in the 
period 2007-2013. While the percentage of such multiple donors is relatively small—4.6%, 
we see that their total donation value is substantially higher – 14.03%7. Taking into 
consideration that many of these donations are proxies for larger exchange based 
mechanisms, we can detach a tendency of cartelization for top donors. Still, as the figures 
show, this is not a mainstream element of the clientelistic relationships presented here, and 
the vast majority of donations remain politically focused on a single beneficiary.  
This evidence suggests that most of the public procurement problems can be traced 
to the construction and infrastructure sectors, where the value of the awarded contracts is 
substantially bigger than in other sectors (Doroftei and Dimulescu 2015). These are also 
sectors where most of the public works would necessitate agreeable relations with the 
political awarding authorities across several mandates, and would constitute a strong 
incentive for political engagement through funding, on behalf of the private contractors.  
 
                                                        
7 Based on triangulated information from the author’s database on party donations, and recently collected data 
by Doroftei and Dimulescu (2015).  
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Table 3: Top Donors with Public Procurement Contracts (amounts in €) 
Party 
 
Company Value of 
Donation 
Year of  
Donation 
Nature of Activity 
PDL Grup Salubrizare Urbana SA 90,000 2008 Cleaning Services 
PDL Transilvania Construct 65,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL Proserv 60,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL SC Victor Construct 25,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL Industrial Montaj Grup 25,000 2008 Infrastructure 
PDL Transilvania Construct 110,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL Criseni SRL 25,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL SC Victor Construct 25,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL Conrec SA 5,000 2010 Constructions 
PDL Euro Grup DG Transport 6,000 2011 Constructions 
PDL Compact Industrial SA 5,000 2011 Labor Protection 
PDL Pro-Consul Prod SRL 25,000 2012 Constructions 
PNL Carpati Proiect SRL 12,500 2008 Constructions 
PNL SC Universal SA 12,000 2008 Constructions 
PNL M&D Cons Investitii SRL 9, 000 2008 Financial Services 
PNL International SA 40,000 2009 Constructions 
PNL 
 
SC Electrosistem SRL 
 
10,500 
 
2009 
 
Electrical 
Components 
PNL Elita Construct 12,500 2010 Constructions 
PNL M&D Cons Investitii SRL 12,500 2010 Financial Services 
PNL SC Simultan SRL 25,000 2012 Food Delivery 
PSD 
 
Modul Proiect SA 
 
125,000 2008 
 
Engineering and 
Infrastructure 
PSD SC Simca SA 125,000 2008 Constructions 
PSD General Concrete SRL 40,000 2008 Constructions 
PSD Deep Serv 2000 SRL 9,000 2008 Cleaning Services 
PSD SC Artego SA 12,500 2008 Rubber Products 
PSD SC Proinvest SRL 50,000 2009 Constructions 
PSD Argenta SRL 10,000 2010 Infrastructure 
PSD SC Simultan SRL 25,000 2012 Food Delivery 
PSD SC Victor Construct 16,000 2012 Constructions 
PSD SC Tehnodomus 9,300 2012 Constructions 
Source: Official Gazette (2009-2013) and Public Procurement announcements 
 
Our bi-dimensional model of clientelism in which the horizontal level focuses only on 
resource accumulation shows congruence with the contextual evidence mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs. Since firms bear little interest in vertical clientelism, i.e. electoral 
mobilization, they supply more parties with resources to maximize their chances of getting 
public procurement. In addition, this procedure is consistent with the earlier discussed 
cartelization of political parties in Romania. There is high likelihood of inter-party 
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cooperation at county levels – the place where most public procurement activity is 
deployed.  As a final detail regarding the donors’ profile, the PNL receives donations from 
investment companies. Apart from their direct interest in public procurement, these 
companies may be a façade for other firms. Public companies might prefer to reroute their 
donations so that they are not directly linked to the party.  
A close look at these donors’ economic activity over time reveals two relevant 
aspects for the clientelistic nexus. Many top donors record significant hikes in their activity 
during electoral years. For example, most donors of the PDL have a turnover increase by ten-
fold in the electoral years of 2008-2009 (when the PDL was in government next to the PSD or 
alone). Also, in the case of the PNL), turnovers of top donors expand significantly during 
election years and some of the companies seize to exist after these years. The latter may 
suggest an instrumental use of private companies with the purpose to channel public funds 
into party organizations.  
 
Conclusions 
This article developed a bi-dimensional model of clientelism that emphasized the existence 
of a horizontal linkage between political parties and private contributors. The core argument 
was that political parties with minimal organizations reduced the spectrum of clientelistic 
exchanges to vote-buying and engaged in cooperation with external actors to secure the 
necessary resources. Accordingly, public resources were no longer used in relationship with 
the electorate, but with private campaign donors. The latter benefited from public 
procurement procedures and continued to supply financial support to political parties.  
This study presented evidence on the relationship between political parties and 
private contractors, and as such it developed a framework for analysis that moves beyond 
fragmented relations (i.e. rich donors – political parties, politicians—corrupt contractors, 
informal electoral exchanges based exclusively on public resources). While the literature has 
recognised both axes (i.e. political parties relationship with resource rich constituencies, and 
political parties clientelistic relationship with the electorate) it has never before attempted 
to correlate all three components, and to trace informal sources of funding with informal 
electoral exchanges, in an empirical, systematic analysis. 
The analysis of Romanian parties between 2008 and 2012 illustrates the functioning 
of this clientelistic model. Empirical evidence showed how parties rely on a relatively small 
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percentage of members and gradually abandon the idea of personal favors and pork-barrel 
as clientelistic exchanges. Instead, they focus extensively on vote-buying practices – in the 
form of outright vote-buying, treating, and conveyance – and they require financial 
resources. Such resources are provided by private firms that receive in exchange preferential 
access to public procurement. As Romanian politics is cartelized, these exchanges take place 
at large scale (i.e. the most important political parties) and on iterative basis. 
 Since the investigated case-study is only illustrative, the applicability of the model is 
likely to be broader. We expect it to be testable in settings with (partial) features of cartel 
politics and limited party organizations. The most important implication of this article is the 
inclusion in the clientelistic model of a clear linkage between political parties and private 
contributors. Along these lines, the theoretical contribution lies in the identification of a 
second clientelistic dimension that deserves further investigation. While we have identified 
some empirical mechanisms in the Romanian case, future research can focus on the diversity 
and challenges of horizontal clientelistic linkages in different settings. Our analysis focused 
on a case with political parties with weak organizations and it is useful to assess the 
character of clientelistic exchanges under relatively strong party organizations. Furthermore, 
research can explore the way in which these horizontal connections between parties and 
private companies shape the vertical linkage between political parties and voters. 
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